The Doklam dispute over undisputed call

The Siliguri Corridor, or Chicken's Neck, is a narrow stretch of land in West Bengal that connects India’s 45 million northeastern people in seven states with rest of India. Nepal and Bangladesh lie on either side of the corridor, and at the narrowest point the corridor is less than 27 km. Bhutan and Indian state of Sikkim are on north of corridor and in between there exists a slice of Chinese territory constituting a tri-junction at one spot. The Indian land stretching from tri-junction to Bangladesh border is at crow-flight distance of about 130 km and the tri-junction is at about 500 km from narrow Chicken’s Neck. The Doklam plateau (Chinese name of same area is Donglang) is the area around tri-junction and portions of Ha (Bhutan), Sikkim (India) and Yadong (China). 

Therefore slightest disturbance in Doklam area is security and geo-strategic sensitivities of highest order for India. India has rushed additional troops in the area where its soldiers have been locked in a standoff with Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) for almost a month, longest impasse between the two armies since 1962. No surprise on army reinforcement, not even to the Chinese. For China it is more like pressing a nerve at India’s strategic space to make their point. For Bhutan Doklam is about boundary talks that is 33 years old and 24 rounds wide diplomatic lifeline. 

The first boundary talk between Bhutan and China was held in April 1984 and last one in August 2016. Each talk discussed how best to resolve the disputed areas including Doklam. I am quite certain that our purpose for the boundary talks was to resolve boundary disputes but wonder if their purpose was the same. If the purpose is same, solution, I tend to think, would converge sooner than anticipated. If not, the end objectives differ. When destinations are different, ‘big boys’ only pretend that they walk the talk along with you. And they do not play zero-sum game when it comes to pursuing their geo-strategic interests.

The 24 rounds of border talks would have always included Doklam as one of the disputed areas. The two governments also conducted Joint Technical Field Survey (JTFS). The JTFS teams have visited Doklam (confirmed by Prime Minister's report below).

The Prime Minister visited disputed areas and presented to the parliament as part of the State of the Nation report, as per  25 August 2015 Kuensel, the following:

“In the western sector, it was reported by the Prime Minister in the State of the Nation report delivered to parliament in June, that the first phase of a joint technical field survey had also been completed.

The disputed areas in the western section are Dramana, Shakhatoe, Sinchulung, and Doklam, in the dzongkhags of Haa and Paro. The areas comprise of 269 sq km of disputed areas. The Prime Minister had also reported that he had been personally visiting these areas. The two countries have agreed to settle the border demarcation issue at the earliest. The talks are based on the guiding principles agreed to in 1998 by the two countries and the agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the Bhutan-China areas signed in 1998.”

The findings and recommendations of JTFS teams were endorsed by 22nd boundary talks as reported through 26 November  2016 Kuensel:

“To understand the dispute, a Joint Technical Field Survey was also conducted and the team had visited the field thrice. The report of the team was endorsed during the 22nd round of border talks. This, Lyonpo Damcho Dorji said has been helpful in reducing the differences in claims between the two countries. The country’s basis for claims, Lyonpo said is on the age-old practise of land usage and administrative authority.” 

        We do not know how helpful the JTFS report was “in reducing the differences in claims between the two countries” and what exactly was meant by “The country’s basis for claims is on the age-old practise of land usage and administrative authority.” The fact remains that JTFS teams visited all disputed areas and their report was endorsed by the representatives of the two governments.

Having come to the point of “The two countries have agreed to settle the border demarcation issue at the earliest” in 2015, some events seem to have taken centerstage from mid-June 2017 undermining progress made so far. On 16th June 2017, PLA started constructing a motorable road from Dokola in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri. Bhutan conveyed to the Chinese side that the construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory was a direct violation of the agreements and affected the process of demarcating the boundary between our two countries. The Indian army was deployed to the area and blocked PLA from constructing the road.

On 29 June 2017 Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang told in his regular conference that Doklam area belonged to China, not Bhutan and India, which had been proven by history and legal principle. China's road construction in Doklam area, which is their territory, was legitimate, and any other party had no right to interfere.

The Chinese media  Global Times  reemphasized that Donglang (Doklam) area belonged to China, not Bhutan and India, which had been proven by history and law. China's road construction in the Donglang area, which is their territory, was legitimate, and any other party had no right to interfere.

Then China released a map to back the above claim accusing Indian troops of "transgressing" into Doklam area of Sikkim sector, to prevent PLA from building a road there. China cited a Britain-China treaty called Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and Tibet signed by British viceroy Lord Lansdowne and lieutenant governor Sheng Tai in 1890 to back its claim on Doklam.

The exact location of the tri-junction is the main issue. While Beijing believes tri-junction is located 2.5 km south of Dokola Pass at Gyamochen/Mt Gimpoche. Bhutan is of the view that the tri-junction is at Batangla, 4 km north of Dokola. So the road construction south of Batangla for us is encroachment in disputed territory. The Chinese consider now up to Gyamochen/Mt Gimpoche is their territory.  And they have said that their territorial sovereignty is unwavering and asked for withdrawal of Indian troops who have overstepped and trespassed into Chinese border. Without the withdrawal they say there will be no boundary talks between India and China. And so on...the statements from Beijing trickle almost every day.

         The Chinese contention that Doklam area (south of Batangla) is in Chinese territory and not under disputed area falls flat from their own perspective having discussed/deliberated last 33 years and visited by JTFS teams for field survey. I am quite certain that the map and the Convention between Great Britain and China of 1890 are not new. The boundary teams would have seen/discussed those before. The boundary talks between Bhutan and China are still ongoing. So reintroduction of old map and Convention at this stage does not make disputed area undisputed, and certainly does not authorize one party to declare so on unilateral basis. It looks more like an attempt to disturb status quo by trying to build a strategic road south of Dokola to make the statement of a neighbour. How serious? If the standoff is not de-escalated early, it can get very serious. Time is the variable.

         If it is really an effort to change status quo, what happens to the earlier written agreements stating that the two sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959? The agreements also stated that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary. 

So what is new and what has changed now? I just cannot believe that our boundary teams missed something so drastic that Doklam could be declared by other party an undisputed territory unilaterally. And also that China wants to carry a big bully stigma internationally and that they ignore all previous agreements/endorsements that have taken 33 years of negotiations. We are in 2017, not 1962. Every corner of the world is interconnected, gets informed and forms opinion in few seconds. It may be possible that our teams goofed a bit that they did not grasp in depth the Chinese diplomacy and their geo-strategy in the region. This is our internal issue. What is it then? Is our neighbour tired of seeking diplomatic relation with us the formal way? Are they perturbed with stagnant geo-politics of the region and looking for dynamism? Can anyone decode the Chinese statements above and those trickling almost every day and confirm these? 

One thing seems more certain that the Chinese have their strategy in line and they also know who they are dealing every time with -- directly, semi-directly and sometimes indirectly. They may even make Bhutan centerpiece of the India-China standoff as a means to achieve their objective. And the objective is.....that everyone knows but do not know. We can afford neither diplomatic indifference of past nor brinkmanship in future. The call is also for us to think (not only blurt out reactive narratives), and think hard! May be we can find diplomatic compromise that will ease tension at Doklam.

As I said in October 2012 “The challenge lies in coming out from dormant attitude on relationship of gratitude and gratefulness to understanding the merger of nationalism with new geopolitical thinking to carve out a comfortable geopolitical space. How many will properly understand the nationalism trends, including reading signs of an advancement towards so called "geopolitik nationalism"? Can we think in terms of the possibility of being an instrument of confidence building?” It may sound asking for too much too soon, but time is not a luxury commodity! And in-between gap is far too wide just like sitting in the middle of the "person is guilty until proven innocent", and "person is innocent until proven guilty."