The Siliguri Corridor, or Chicken's Neck, is a
narrow stretch of land in West Bengal that connects India’s 45 million
northeastern people in seven states with rest of India. Nepal and Bangladesh
lie on either side of the corridor, and at the narrowest point the corridor is
less than 27 km. Bhutan and Indian state of Sikkim are on north of corridor and
in between there exists a slice of Chinese territory constituting a
tri-junction at one spot. The Indian land stretching from tri-junction to
Bangladesh border is at crow-flight distance of about 130 km and the
tri-junction is at about 500 km from narrow Chicken’s Neck. The Doklam plateau
(Chinese name of same area is Donglang) is the area around tri-junction and
portions of Ha (Bhutan), Sikkim (India) and Yadong (China).
Therefore slightest disturbance in Doklam
area is security and geo-strategic sensitivities of highest order for
India. India has rushed additional troops in the area where its soldiers have
been locked in a standoff with Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) for
almost a month, longest impasse between the two armies since 1962. No surprise
on army reinforcement, not even to the Chinese. For China it is more like
pressing a nerve at India’s strategic space to make their point. For
Bhutan Doklam is about boundary talks that is 33 years old and 24 rounds wide
diplomatic lifeline.
The first boundary talk between Bhutan and China was held in
April 1984 and last one in August 2016. Each talk discussed how best to resolve
the disputed areas including Doklam. I am quite certain that our purpose for
the boundary talks was to resolve boundary disputes but wonder if their purpose
was the same. If the purpose is same, solution, I tend to think, would converge
sooner than anticipated. If not, the end objectives differ. When destinations
are different, ‘big boys’ only pretend that they walk the talk along with
you. And they do not play zero-sum game when it comes to pursuing their geo-strategic interests.
The 24 rounds of border talks would have always included Doklam
as one of the disputed areas. The two governments also conducted Joint
Technical Field Survey (JTFS). The JTFS teams have visited Doklam (confirmed by
Prime Minister's report below).
The Prime Minister visited disputed areas and presented to the
parliament as part of the State of the Nation report, as per 25 August
2015 Kuensel, the
following:
“In the western sector, it was reported by the Prime Minister
in the State of the Nation report delivered to parliament in June, that the
first phase of a joint technical field survey had also been completed.
The disputed areas in the western section are Dramana,
Shakhatoe, Sinchulung, and Doklam, in the dzongkhags of Haa and Paro. The areas
comprise of 269 sq km of disputed areas. The Prime Minister had also reported
that he had been personally visiting these areas. The two countries have agreed
to settle the border demarcation issue at the earliest. The talks are based on
the guiding principles agreed to in 1998 by the two countries and the agreement
on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the Bhutan-China areas signed
in 1998.”
The findings and recommendations of JTFS teams were endorsed by
22nd boundary talks as reported through 26 November 2016 Kuensel:
“To understand the dispute, a Joint Technical Field Survey
was also conducted and the team had visited the field thrice. The report of the
team was endorsed during the 22nd round of border talks. This, Lyonpo Damcho
Dorji said has been helpful in reducing the differences in claims between the two
countries. The country’s basis for claims, Lyonpo said is on the age-old
practise of land usage and administrative authority.”
We do not know how helpful the JTFS report was “in reducing the differences in claims between the two countries” and what exactly was meant by “The country’s basis for claims is on the age-old practise of land usage and administrative authority.” The fact remains that JTFS teams visited all disputed areas and their report was endorsed by the representatives of the two governments.
Having come to the point of “The two countries have agreed to
settle the border demarcation issue at the earliest” in 2015, some events
seem to have taken centerstage from mid-June 2017 undermining progress made so
far. On 16th June 2017, PLA started constructing a motorable road from Dokola
in the Doklam area towards the Bhutan Army camp at Zompelri. Bhutan conveyed to the Chinese side that the construction of the road
inside Bhutanese territory was a direct violation of the agreements and
affected the process of demarcating the boundary between our two countries. The Indian army was deployed to the area and blocked PLA from constructing the road.
On 29 June 2017 Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Lu Kang told in his
regular conference that Doklam area belonged to China, not Bhutan and
India, which had been proven by history and legal principle. China's road
construction in Doklam area, which is their territory, was legitimate, and any
other party had no right to interfere.
The Chinese media Global Times reemphasized
that Donglang (Doklam) area belonged to China, not Bhutan and India, which had
been proven by history and law. China's road construction in the Donglang area,
which is their territory, was legitimate, and any other party had no right to
interfere.
Then China released a map to back the above claim accusing
Indian troops of "transgressing" into Doklam area of Sikkim sector,
to prevent PLA from building a road there. China cited a Britain-China treaty
called Convention between Great Britain and China relating to Sikkim and
Tibet signed by British viceroy Lord Lansdowne and lieutenant governor Sheng
Tai in 1890 to back its claim on Doklam.
The exact location of the tri-junction is the main issue. While
Beijing believes tri-junction is located 2.5 km south of Dokola Pass at Gyamochen/Mt Gimpoche. Bhutan is of
the view that the tri-junction is at Batangla, 4 km north of Dokola. So the road construction south of Batangla for us is encroachment in disputed territory. The Chinese consider now up to Gyamochen/Mt Gimpoche is their territory. And they have said that their
territorial sovereignty is unwavering and asked for withdrawal of Indian troops
who have overstepped and trespassed into Chinese border. Without the withdrawal
they say there will be no boundary talks between India and China. And so
on...the statements from Beijing trickle almost every day.
The Chinese contention that Doklam area (south of Batangla) is in Chinese territory and not under disputed area falls flat from their own perspective having discussed/deliberated last 33 years and visited by JTFS teams for field survey. I am quite certain that the map and the Convention between Great Britain and China of 1890 are not new. The boundary teams would have seen/discussed those before. The boundary talks between Bhutan and China are still ongoing. So reintroduction of old map and Convention at this stage does not make disputed area undisputed, and certainly does not authorize one party to declare so on unilateral basis. It looks more like an attempt to disturb status quo by trying to build a strategic road south of Dokola to make the statement of a neighbour. How serious? If the standoff is not de-escalated early, it can get very serious. Time is the variable.
If it is really an effort to change status quo, what happens to the earlier written agreements stating that the two sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility in their border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959? The agreements also stated that the two sides will refrain from taking unilateral action, or use of force, to change the status quo of the boundary.
So what is new and what has changed now? I just cannot believe
that our boundary teams missed something so drastic that Doklam could be
declared by other party an undisputed territory unilaterally. And also that China wants to carry a big bully stigma internationally and that they ignore
all previous agreements/endorsements that have taken 33 years of negotiations.
We are in 2017, not 1962. Every corner of the world is interconnected, gets
informed and forms opinion in few seconds. It may be possible that our
teams goofed a bit that they did not grasp in depth the Chinese diplomacy and their
geo-strategy in the region. This is our internal issue. What is it then? Is our
neighbour tired of seeking diplomatic relation with us the formal way? Are
they perturbed with stagnant geo-politics of the region and looking for dynamism? Can
anyone decode the Chinese statements above and those trickling almost every day
and confirm these?
One thing seems more certain that the Chinese have their
strategy in line and they also know who they are dealing every time with --
directly, semi-directly and sometimes indirectly. They may even make Bhutan
centerpiece of the India-China standoff as a means to achieve
their objective. And the objective is.....that everyone knows but do not know. We can afford neither diplomatic indifference of past nor brinkmanship in future. The call is also for us to think (not only blurt out reactive narratives), and
think hard! May be we can find diplomatic compromise that will ease tension at Doklam.
As
I said in October 2012 “The challenge lies in coming out from dormant
attitude on relationship of gratitude and gratefulness to understanding the
merger of nationalism with new geopolitical thinking to carve out a comfortable
geopolitical space. How many will properly understand the nationalism trends,
including reading signs of an advancement towards so called "geopolitik
nationalism"? Can we think in terms of the possibility of being an
instrument of confidence building?” It may sound asking for too much too soon,
but time is not a luxury commodity! And in-between gap is far too wide just like sitting in the middle of the "person is guilty until proven innocent", and "person is innocent until proven guilty."
