The geopolitics as plain link between political power and
geographic space is more traditional. The ensemble of relations between the
interests of international political actors; interests focused to an area,
space, geographical element or ways; and relations which create a geopolitical
system is contemporary. No two countries have similar geopolitical environment.
Therefore dimensions are intricate or even “sensitive” if one is unequal “among
equals”. If sandwiched as unequal “among equals” the intricacies multiply.
The geography cannot be altered. Politics bears the brunt of
shouldering the national geostrategic interest through its potent depth. If the
institutions of democracy are still young and are yet to take firm root to
provide a solid foundation for ensuring the rule of law and transparent
governance with adequate checks and balances, the key concern is the ability to
safeguard national interest in international arena. There is need for matching
intellectual depth and maturity to understand the multi-dimensional changing
geopolitical atmosphere and to have strategic foresight.
Let us take a look at our geopolitical situation down south as
well as up north!
Bhutan is bounded on three sides by the Indian states of
Sikkim, West Bengal, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh. The first friendship treaty
between India and Bhutan was signed in November 11, 1865 when India was under
British rule. In the 1870s and 1880s, there was renewed competition between
pro-British Penlop of Tongsa and the anti-British, pro-Tibetan Penlop of Paro.
The Tongsa Penlop defeated his political enemies and united the country.
Thereafter British India was the first country to recognize Bhutan when it
became a monarchy and the friendship treaty was renewed in 1910. Bhutan
reciprocated and was the first country to recognize Indian independence. The
India-Bhutan treaty was revised in 1949. On August 8, 1949 India and Bhutan
signed the Treaty of Friendship (TOF) in Darjeeling by Sri Harishwar Dayal,
representing India and Gongzin Sonam Topgye Dorji, Yangbi Lopon Sonam and Ha
Drung Jigme Palden Dorji representing Bhutan.
The ten-article treaty, in force in perpetuity, called for peace
between the two nations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.
While the TOF also established free trade and extradition protocols, Article 2
of TOF read: "The Government of India undertakes to exercise no
interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the
Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of
India in regard to its external relations." The Indian non-interference in
Bhutan's internal affairs in return for Bhutan's agreeing to Indian guidance in
regard to its external relations was quite clear. During those days India’s relations
with Bhutan were looked after by a Political Officer from the Ministry of
External Affairs in Sikkim. In his first visit to Bhutan in 1958, Indian prime
minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru reiterated India's wish that Bhutan remain an
independent country, "taking the path of progress according to your
will." The full diplomatic relation between India and Bhutan was
established in 1968 affirming Pandit Nehru's statement.
Bhutan joined the United Nation in 1971, and its perspective of
the world broadened. Two years later, Bhutan and Bangladesh exchanged
diplomatic recognition. A new interpretation of the India-Bhutan relationship
began to emerge in 1974 when Lyonpo Dawa Tsering, Bhutan's minister of foreign
affairs, said that whether or not Bhutan followed India's advice and guidance
on foreign policy matters was optional. The statement in 1979 by Druk Gyalpo
that the 1949 treaty needed to be "updated" was still another signal
of a need to incorporate in the treaty the changed reality. The country needed
to put forth its own stance on a number of smaller issues and identity in
international forums. For instance at the Non-Aligned Movement summit
conference in Havana in 1979, Bhutan voted with other Asian countries rather
than with India allowing Cambodia's Khmer Rouge to be seated at the conference.
Also Bhutan's votes in the UN on such issues as the status of landlocked
nations also did not follow fully the Indian leads.
On February 8, 2007, the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty (IBFT) updating the TOF was signed and came into force following the
exchange of Instruments of Ratification between the two governments in Thimphu
on March 2, 2007. Under the IBFT Article 2 reads as, "In keeping with the
abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the
Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India
shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national
interests. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for
activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other."
The notion of the IBFT strengthening Bhutan’s sovereign nation
status was apparent as its preamble included "Reaffirming their respect
for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity", a
feature that was absent in the earlier version. The updated IBTF laid the foundation
for future development and provided, among others, for perpetual peace and
friendship, free trade and commerce, and equal justice to each other's
citizens. With improvements in communications and transportation, geopolitical
factors need to take time-adjusted shape to influence foreign policies. Also,
haven't we all grown to greater balance and neutrality, and respect for such a
growth?
To the north Bhutan shares a contiguous 470 km border with
China. Bhutan and part of China that borders Bhutan --Tibet, or the Xinjiang
Autonomous Region -- shares historical, cultural, and religious ties. Bhutan
has had neither a tributary relationship with Beijing then (even though
Bhutanese delegations to the Dalai Lama came into contact with the Chinese
representatives in Lhasa) nor diplomatic relations now. Those days even
relations with Tibet was never particularly good when Bhutan sided with British
India. And, China trying to secure its southwestern edge claiming a vague
suzerainty over Bhutan just before the Chinese Revolution of 1911 did not help
foster links. The new People's Republic of China let the claim elapse, and it
has never again been raised publicly.
The fall of Tibet under the Chinese in 1951 increased tension in
Bhutan-China relation. The 1959 Tibetan uprisings and the flight of the H.H.
Dalai Lama to India followed by massive presence of Chinese People's Liberation
Army along northern border running through eight enclaves administered by
Bhutan since 17th century alerted Bhutan to the potential threat it faced.
Bhutan’s representative in Tibet was also withdrawn. India intervened with
Beijing on behalf of Bhutan, but the Chinese refused to discuss what they
considered a matter between China and Bhutan. Also there was problem with
regard to the flight of some 6,000 Tibetan refugees to Bhutan. Then China
published a map in 1961 that showed alterations of traditional Sino-Bhutanese
and other Himalayan borders raising renewed claim to its southwest including
Bhutan, Sikkim, and Nepal. Bhutan responded with cross-border trade embargo and
closer ties with India.
Then Sino-Indian border war broke out in 1962. Bhutan became
more apprehensive of China. Since then there were cross-border intrusions by
Chinese soldiers and Tibetan herders starting in 1966, and a larger than usual
annual incursion by Tibetan herders into Bhutan in 1979. Both Thimphu and New
Delhi protested to Beijing. China responded to open direct talks with Bhutan.
A series of 20 border talks has been held between the ministers
of foreign of affairs of Bhutan and China since April 1984. The 20th talk led
by Chinese Vice Foreign Minister and Bhutanese Foreign Minister-in-Charge was
held in Thimphu on August 20, 2012, soon after Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigmi Y. Thinley had a meeting for the first
time with Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao on June 21, 2012 on the sidelines of the
UN Conference on Sustainable Development at Rio de Janeiro. The Chinese
state-run news agency Xinhua reported that two leaders “expressed willingness to establish formal
diplomatic ties between their countries” and were willing to settle border
issues in a cooperative manner.
The Xinhua report was picked by Indian media with a
perspective of border dispute: “Any settlement of the Bhutan-China border is
significant for India as Chumbi Valley – a vital tri-junction between Bhutan,
India and China border - is 500 km from Siliguri corridor and the “Chicken’s
Neck” which connects India to its Northeast states and Nepal to Bhutan. Indian
strategic analysts say that the Chumbi Valley is of geo-strategic importance to
China because of its shared borders with Tibet and Sikkim.”
A joint study conducted by the Indian Ministry of External
Affairs (MEA) and Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA), released in
New Delhi on July 13, 2012 by foreign secretary Ranjan Mathai, discussed
potential shift in Bhutan’s foreign policy, having far reaching impact on
India’s strategic and political interests.
“There are already
concerns on the Indian side over increasing Chinese foray into Bhutanese
territory and efforts to engage Bhutan at various for a in the past years.
China has so far built 6 roads closer to Bhutan’s border towns in the north and
northwest,” says the joint MEA-IDSA study.
Also the study pointed out public resentment regarding the
location of Indian Army Military Training Team in Haa.
Indian media reported that “With the increasing
democratisation, communists consolidating their position, coupled with
“sub-standard” works of Indian contractors, is costing India its long-term and
the closest ally in South Asia. The tiny Himalayan nation Bhutan is increasing
moving away from it.”
During 20th border
talk the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Fu
Ying said
“We are willing to work with Bhutan towards early establishment of
diplomatic relations between the two countries. The border dispute between
the two countries does not cover a wide area. The two sides should speed up
border talks in the spirit of mutual understanding and accommodation, with a
view to arriving at a fair and reasonable and mutually acceptable solution.
This will contribute to peace and stability in our border areas.” All these
were picked in an IDSA Comment.
Following the border talks a quiet visit by security personnel
and goodwill visit by Indian army chief from August 25-29, 2012 are quite
understandable. What is not, is the geopolitics not having wider and broader
digital age significance.
The challenge lies in coming out from dormant attitude on relationship of gratitude and gratefulness to understanding the merger of
nationalism with new geopolitical thinking to carve out a comfortable
geopolitical space. How many will properly understand the nationalism trends,
including reading signs of an advancement towards so called "geopolitik
nationalism"? Can we think in terms of the possibility of being an
instrument of confidence building?
“We know states come and go like human beings, countries
evolve so there is no reason for countries like Bhutan or India or China to
remain the same in 40 years time. So in some sense we need to be aware of our
history so that we can prepare our future. Those who ignore history will also
be ignored,” says Prof. Dibyesh Anand of London’s Westminster University.
